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ABSTRACT 
Resource  curse  literatures  explain  that  countries  abundant  with  natural  resources 
tend to grow slower. This hypothesis is relevant for Indonesia as it is a country rich 
in  natural  resources.  This  paper  tries  to  investigate  empirically  the  relationship 
between  resources  abundance  and  its  impact  on  economic  development  at  the 
regional level using cross section regression approach. The regional financial data 
from ministry of finance are combined with regional specific data from BPS to seek 
the pattern. The paper will shed light on whether resources rich regions in Indonesia 
are trapped in this curse. 
Keywords: Natural resource rent, resource curse hypothesis, region, Indonesia 
JEL classification: Q01, Q56, R11 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The  role  of  oil,  gas  and  other  mineral  sectors  is  very  significant  in  Indonesian 
economics although they do not constitute the  main sectors, since the structural 
changes at 1986. The contribution of these natural resources sector to the Indonesian 
economy constitutes about 27% of GDP in 1992 and has declined to less than 24% 
in 2005. Even though they do not constitute the main sectors of the Indonesian 
economy, their contribution to government revenue is still significant.  
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In 2005, at least Rp 110.391 billion or about 22 percent of government revenue came 
from  non-tax  natural  resources  revenue,  making  it  the  second  most  important 
revenue source after income tax from non oil and gas.  This much money used to 
provide  more  benefits  for  the  society.  As  Indonesia  is  a  country  endowed  with 
abundant natural resources, we would expect this endowment to contribute to a 
significant  welfare  and  economic  improvement.  However  the  phenomenon  of 
natural resources abundance versus welfare and economic prosperity is not assured 
and is an empirical question. 
The phenomenon of natural resource abundance and economic prosperity is also 
relevant at the micro or regional level. Such questions are also relevant for Indonesia, 
the country abundant with natural resources, with high disparity of development at 
the regional level (province or district level). Casual observation leads us to some 
contradictory expectation, for example based on IHDR 2004 (see figure 1), resource 
rich regions dominated the regions with high level of poverty rate. The picture is true 
at  the  province  as  well  as  district  level  within  the  particular  province.  Several 
examples may strengthen this observation. For example let us look at the case of 
Papua. Although Papua is high in natural resources endowment, it has one of the 
highest poverty rate at 38.69% in 2004. Another ironic example is the province of 
NAD, with plenty of oil and natural gas resources and yet 28.47% of its populations 
are poor.  
The observation above has lead us to question whether natural resources endowment 
and revenues help the regions in their welfare and economic development. Or in 
other words whether natural resources have become a curse rather than a gift for 
regions in Indonesia. The question above has become more important in the period 
after decentralization in Indonesia, when regions have become more autonomous in 
managing their welfare and economic development. Natural resources rich region in 
particular  are  supposed  to  benefit  with  the  substantial  increase  in  their  natural 
resources revenue sharing.  
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Figure 1: Human Poverty Index by Province, 2002 
 
Note: The diamond represents the average value for the province, while the line runs from the 
lowest to the highest values among the districts in that province. 
Source: IHDR 2004.  
This paper aims to answer the above question with the following structure. The next 
section takes a closer look at various literature findings of resource curse hypothesis. 
Section III describes the empirical analyses for the hypothesis, data and sources of 
data.  It  describes  the  resource  curse  growth  model  and  analyzes  the  empirical 
findings of the estimation and section IV concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The phenomenon experienced by several resources rich regions in Indonesia has 
attracted  researcher  for  many  years.  It  was  observed,  for  example,  that    many 
resources rich countries, experienced a lower growth of income compared to those 
resources poor countries (especially after the first oil boom and Dutch disease). This 
phenomenon of slow development in the presence of resource abundance is known 
as the resource curse hypothesis. 4 
Lynn  (1997)  explains  about  the  existence  of  a  paradoxical  experience  by  natural 
resources rich countries. It is expected that countries rich in natural resources may be 
able to exploit these resources for the benefit of higher economic growth, poverty 
alleviation and technological transfer. Other things being equal, resource abundant 
countries should be able to increase their level of per capita welfare. Atkinson and 
Hamilton (2003) describe the advantage of natural wealth as two folds. First, the 
discovery and development of natural resources can lead to a short-term increase in 
the rate of economic growth; second, this can raise the level of income that can be 
sustained into the future.  
Many cases contradict the fact. Natural resources wealth, if not properly managed or 
reinvested back, may harm economic performance and make the citizens worse off. 
Some countries endowed with oil and gas e.g. Iran, Venezuela and some African 
countries, experience a lower economic growth rate than the countries actually poor 
in natural resources such as Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea.  
Many studies have been conducted to reveal the nature of this curse. One of the well 
known studies which generalized this finding across large samples of countries is 
Sachs and Warner (1995). Using the share of natural resource exports in GDP as 
resource abundance indicator, this study found statistically significant evidence for a 
negative relationship between per capita economic growth and resource abundance 
over 1970-1990. In this pioneering cross-country evidence there is no role for quality 
of institutions or bureaucracy in explaining the natural resource curse. 
However not all study findings support the hypothesis. In contrast, Rosser (2004) 
presents evidence that the curse could not be generalized, especially for Indonesia. 
This finding is based on the fact that while Indonesia is blessed with natural wealth, it 
has been experiencing moderate economic performance. This fact could be explained 
from  the  higher  economic  growth  during  1967  –  2000  relative  to  the  other  oil 
exporting  countries.  Rosser  suggests  that  Indonesia’s  success  stemmed  from  two 
factors, the policies and institutions employed by the New Order era and the nature 
of Indonesia’s geo-political and geo-economic environment. Despite this finding at 5 
the  national  level,  question  on  the  resource  curse  hypothesis  is  still  valid  at  the 
regional level of Indonesia.  
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Framework and Model 
To test the natural resources curse hypothesis at the regional level, we start from the 
basic growth model that has been derived by several authors, that is:  
( ) ε α α α + + + = Z y T
y T y
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Equation 1 is a regression model of the growth rate of GDP per capita on various 
explanatory variables, using cross sectional regression to test the effect of natural 
resources  abundance  and  other  explanatory  variables.  Given  our  interest  in 
determining the possible effect of natural resource abundance on economic growth, 
we use resource rent (in total or by division) as proxy on resources abundance. Other 
explanatory  variables  are  human  capital  measured  by  mean  years  of  schooling; 
investment as fraction of GDP; and initial level of income. All variables are measured 
at the beginning year of the period, i.e. 2001, except for the growth rate of GDP 
which is measured using average values over the period. In addition, to control for 
regional factors, we add dummy variables: Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Papua and 
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Where: 
y γ   = average growth over the period,  
gdpcap    = initial level of income per capita, 6 
edu  = mean years schooling at initial years,  
invest  = investment ratio in 2001, 
rent  = share of resource rents in GDP in 2001,  
G  =  share  of  government  expenditure  (consumption  and  investment)  in 
GDP in 2001, 
i   = district index,  
j   =  resource  rent  index  (forest,  mining,  oil  and  gas  sector,  and  total 
resource rent), and  
k   =policy  related  variables  index  (Government  consumption  and 
Government investment). 
In equation (3), we include a range of policy related variables which are the share of 
government  consumption  and  share  of  government  investment.  Equation  (4) 
incorporates  the  interaction  term  between  natural  resources  and  policy  related 
variables. This term allows us to test whether the negative effect of natural resources 
on the rate of growth decreases as policy related variables increases, as implied in our 
model. 
3.2. Data and Scope of Analysis 
We estimate the empirical model using cross sectional analysis. The data used in the 
regressions cover the period of 2001 until 2004, consisting of initial period data for 
all explanatory variables and period average data for the dependent variable. 
The dependent variable, y γ , is the average rate of growth of GRDP per capita at 
constant  2000  prices.  The  data  for  this  variable  are  taken  from  BPS  (2006)  that 
covers 438 districts. This variable is measured as period 2001 until 2004 average. 
Due to lack of human capital data for all districts in 2001, we use the data of mean 
years of schooling for the year 2002 instead. This data is taken from IHDR 2004 and 
covers only 340 districts. The share of gross capital formation in GDP 2001 at the 
province level are used as proxy for investment variable, therefore assuming the same 
level of investment for districts within  the same province.  7 
Institutional  variables  introduced  in  our  second  stage  regression  consist  of  two 
variables.  First,  government  consumption  measured  as  the  share  of  government 
routine expenditure in GRDP 2001. Second, government investment measured as 
the share of development expenditure in GRDP 2001. Both routine expense and 
(development  expenditure)  are  taken  from  the  2001  district  government  budget 
(APBD) published by the ministry of finance.  
Measuring Natural Resources Abundance 
There  are  many  proxies  that  have  been  employed  by  scholars  to  measure  the 
abundance of natural resources, such as share of mining production in GDP, land 
per capita, share of natural resources export in GDP, share of labor force in the 
primary sector and mining employment. Each proxy has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Following Atkinson and Hamilton (2004), share of resource rents in 
GDP constitute the preferred measurement of natural resources abundance for this 
study.  
Total resource rent for each resource is defined as the product of a given resource’s 
unit rent (its world price minus country-specific extraction costs) and total units or 
quantity extracted (or harvested). Sometimes it is very difficult to get the extraction 
cost (marginal cost). To solve this problem, in practice it is common to use average 
cost. Even though this approach has simplified the measurement, however it still 
impossible to attaint the average cost at district level. The average cost and extracted 
quantity of natural resources are usually available at the national level. The lack of 
these data has challenged us to find the best available proxy. We have derived natural 
resources revenue for each region through their share in natural resources revenue 
sharing.  
Total resource rent is estimated from the natural resources revenue sharing for each 
district. Besides the total rent, we also estimate major natural resources by type such 
as mining sector (land rent and royalty), oil and natural gas sector, forestry sector, 
and  (forest  product  royalty/  IHH,  forest  concession  license  fee/  IHPH  and 
reforestation fund).  8 
Figure  2  describes  the  flow  that  we  followed  to  get  resources  rent  from  natural 
resources revenue sharing data. First, the natural resources revenue sharing data were 
split into three parts.  The first part consists only of the sectors that are shared by the 
producing district (mining land rent and forestry license concession fee). The second 
part consists of sectors that are shared with the producing district as well as with the 
other districts in relevan province for mining royalty and forest product royalty. The 
last part consists of sectors that were shared with the producing district as well as 
with the other districts in the relevan province for the oil and natural gas sector. We 
split the oil and natural gas sector from mining royalty since it consists not only of 
the  revenue  sharing  between  central  and  local  government  but  also  between  the 
contractor and central government.  
For the first part, we employ a simple formula for revenue sharing received by each 
district based on sharing mechanism of Law 25/ 1999, to get the total revenue that is 
shared for each sector (Xpi) from each producing district. The second part is more 
complicated  than  the  first  part.  For  the  second  part  we  should  distinguish  the 
producing district from the other districts in the relevant province that also receive 
the revenue sharing but not with the same percentage as the producing district. Then, 
we employ the second formula to get the total revenue shared for each sector (Xpi) 
from each producing district. The total revenue from this part combined with the 
total revenue we get from the first part constitutes the total resource rent in mining 
and forestry sector.  
The oil and natural gas revenue sharing data are extrapolated separately based on 
revenue sharing scheme based of Law 25/ 1999 to obtain the net operating income 
(NOI) for oil and gas at each producing district. These are lifting value (selling value 
of oil and gas) after subtracting exploration cost. In getting NOI for oil as well as 
natural gas, first we employ the calculation as has been discussed in part two. This 
number reflects the total revenue shared between central and local government not 
the NOI. To get the total value reflecting the total oil and gas produced by each 
district, then we have to divide it with the revenue sharing percentage between the 
contractor and the central government, (i.e. 53.4% for oil and 26.81% for natural 9 
gas). Furthermore, the oil and natural gas sector rent is the summation of both NOI 
of oil and natural gas sector.  
Although this proxy could explain the extent of natural resources abundance in a 
district, it has several weaknesses. The estimation is still rough and hence the results 
may underestimate the true value of resources rent. In addition, the coverage of our 
estimation is limited to only three major resources, without taking into account other 
resources  that  can  be  more  abundant  in  some  districts,  such  as  agriculture,  and 
fisheries. 
 
Table 4: Natural resource revenue-sharing arrangement based on Law 25/ 1999 












A  Oil and natural gas sector 
1 
State revenue from 
oil after tax has been 
deducted 
85%  3%  6%  6%  - 
2 
State revenue from 
natural gas after tax 
has been deducted 
70%  6%  12%  12%  - 
B  Non oil and natural gas sector 
1  Mining Sector           
   - Land Rent  20%  16%  64%  -  - 
   - Royalty  20%  16%  32%  32%  - 
2  Forestry Sector           
   - Forest product 
royalty (PSDH)  20%  16%  32%  32%  - 
   - Forest Concession 
license fee (IHPH)  20%  16%  64%  -  - 
   - Reforestation fund   60%  -  40%  -  - 
3  Fisheries Sector  20%  -  -  -  80% 











































Notes:   Xpi   = Total revenue shared from producing district i 
  Ypi   = Total revenue sharing receipt by a producing district i  
  S   = Total revenue sharing receipt by other districts in relevant province  
  α   = Percentage of revenue-sharing for district level for natural resource k   
  n   = Number of district in relevant province   
  k   = Natural resource index 
  i   = District index 
  NOI  = net operating income 
   0.534 = percentage of oil NOI’s shared to local government 
  0.2681 = percentage of natural gas NOI’s shared to local government 
 
Source: Authors calculation based on Bappenas, NRM and LPEM-FEUI (2000). 
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2nd Formula 11 
Due to data paucity for several variables in the districts level, this study could only 
covers 246 districts in 28 provinces. The descriptive statistics of all variables used in 
this model are given in table 1.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
 Average Growth of  GRDP per Capita 01-04   246  0.027  0.052  (0.192)  0.310 
 GRDP per Capita 01   246  7,710,997  20,381,628  1,355,399  275,000,000 
 Human Capital   246  7.242  1.602  2.200  11.100 
 Investment   246  0.169  0.041  0.071  0.364 
 Total Rent   246  0.051  0.179  0.000  1.392 
Rent _mining   246  0.003  0.032  0.000  0.491 
Rent_Forestry   246  0.008  0.029  0.000  0.242 
Rent_Oil&Gas    246  0.040  0.175  0.000  1.387 
 Government Investment   246  0.043  0.056  0.001  0.456 
 Government Consumption   246  0.080  0.057  0.003  0.357 
 Jawa   86         
 Sumatra   66         
 Kalimantan   27         
 Sulawesi   34         
 Papua   10         
 Others   23         
Source: Authors calculation 
3.3 Results 
Our first empirical estimation result is reported in Table 2. The negative coefficient 
on initial income (log Gdpcap) implies a rate of conditional convergence, of about 1-
2% per year. Mean years of schooling have the expected positive signs and significant 
at 10% level. The share of gross domestic fixed capital formation as a measure of 
investment also has the expected positive signs, although it is not significant. The 
coefficient  of  resource  abundance  variable,  i.e.  rent_total,  has  positive  signs  but 
statistically not significant, even at 10% level.  
If we try to explore the relationship by adding the institutional policy related variable 
(regression  2.2  and  2.4)  and  also  the  interaction  between  these  variables  with 
resource rent (regression 2.3 and 2.5), we still can not reveal the relationship between 
growth  and  resource  abundance.  The  total  resource  rent  coefficient  has  been 
consistently  statistically  insignificant.  This  finding  at  the  regional  level  confirms 12 
observation  made  by  Rosser  (2004)  of  the  non  existence  of  resource  curse  in 
Indonesia.  
However, different patterns emerge when we break the resource rent into its three 
components and redo the estimation.  
Table 3 summarizes the results of growth regression in the context of the resource 
curse with three component of resources rent. Table 3 introduces three components 
of the resource curse variable: (1) the share of forest rent in GDP (Rent_forest); (2) 
the share of mining rent in GDP (Rent_mining); and, (3) the share of oil and gas rent 
in GDP (Rent_oil&gas).  
The results show that human capital still has a positive sign and significant at the 
10% level except in regression (3.3) and (3.5). The investment indicator is persistently 
statistically  non  significant,  although  it  has  the  expected  positive  sign.  Table  3 
indicates some interesting findings for the component of resources rent. 
The results for regression using on the broken-down data of resource rent show 
some significant effects. Regression 3.3 shows that two out of three resource rents, 
i.e. forest sector rent and mining sector rent are significant at 5% level. The positive 
and significant forest rent effect only occurs when we add government consumption 
variable  and  its  interaction  with  forest  and  mining  rent.  The  interaction  variable 
between forest sector rent and government consumption has a negative sign and 
significant at 10% level. The negative sign on this variable reflect the fact that the 
curse will occur if the revenue from this sector is not invested appropriately for 
public services provision. In this regression, the mining sector rent has the opposite 
sign with forestry; this means that mining sector endowment will harm economic 
growth. However, the interaction between mining and government sector is also 
significant but has positive signs. This implies that the curse will be lessened if the 
mining sector revenues are reinvested in public services provision.  
Regression 3.5 shows other interesting findings. Forest sector rent is negative, but 
statistically insignificant. While the mining sector rent is persistently negative and 
significant. However, the oil and gas sector rent becomes significant and has positive 13 
sign. The oil and gas sector rent interaction variable is both negative and significant. 
This implies that the contribution of this sector rent towards economic growth will 
be lessened because it has not been properly invested in government investment.  
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS   
This study has constructed a different measure of resource rent to investigate the 
nature of resource curse hypothesis. Total resource rent is estimated from the natural 
resources revenue sharing for each district. Besides the total rent, we also estimate 
major natural resources by type such as mining, oil and natural gas, and forestry. 
The  estimations  show  that  when  we  use  total  resource  rent,  the  results  are 
insignificant even after we add government policy related variables. However, there 
appears  to  be  resource  curse  when  we  estimate  the  resource  rent  in  its  three 
components.  Forest,  oil  and  gas  sector  rent  have  positive  effect  on  regional 
economic growth. But the resource curse may occur if these resources revenues are 
not invested properly in public sector, either for the provision of public services or in 
public  investment.  Meanwhile,  mining  sector  has  persistently  negative  effect  on 
regional economic growth. The existence of this curse will be lessened if the mining 









Table 2: Resource abundance and economic growth (standar errors in parentheses)
 # 
Variables  (2.1)    (2.2)    (2.3)    (2.4)    (2.5) 
Log(Gdpcap)  -0.0146     -0.0206     -0.0208     -0.0145     -0.0140  
  (0.0059) **    (0.0068) ***    (0.0068) ***    (0.0062) **    (0.0062) ** 
Rent_total  0.0026     0.0058     0.0303     0.0025     0.0315  
  (0.0208)     (0.0208)     (0.0263)     (0.0210)     (0.0275)  
Edu  0.0042     0.0045     0.0045     0.0042     0.0044  
  (0.0025) *    (0.0025) *    (0.0025) *    (0.0025) **    (0.0025) * 
Invest  0.0658     0.0691     0.0869     0.0663     0.0803  
  (0.0918)     (0.0914)     (0.0919)     (0.0934)     (0.0935)  
Gcon        -0.1453     -0.1222            
        (0.0812) *    (0.0824)            
Rent * Gcon             -0.5892            
             (0.3880)            
Ginv                  0.0026     0.0587  
                  (0.0835)     (0.0902)  
Rent * Ginv                       -0.7100  
                       (0.4394)  
Sumatra  -0.0049     -0.0031     -0.0029     -0.0049     -0.0069  
  (0.0089)     (0.0090)     (0.0089)     (0.0092)     (0.0093)  
Kalimantan  -0.0041     0.0016     0.0022     -0.0043     -0.0063  
  (0.0130)     (0.0133)     (0.0133)     (0.0140)     (0.0140)  
Sulawesi  -0.0137     -0.0088     -0.0098     -0.0138     -0.0152  
  (0.0105)     (0.0108)     (0.0108)     (0.0108)     (0.0108)  
Papua  0.0385     0.0594     0.0653     0.0380     0.0396  
  (0.0183) **    (0.0216) ***    (0.0219) ***    (0.0246)     (0.0245)  
Others  -0.0086     -0.0024     -0.0041     -0.0086     -0.0107  
  (0.0124)     (0.0128)     (0.0128)     (0.0127)     (0.0128)  
C  0.2130     0.3108     0.3098     0.2120     0.1989  
  (0.0881) **    (0.1033) ***    (0.1030) ***    (0.0937) **    (0.0938) ** 
                         
R-Squared  0.0642     0.0768     0.0858     0.0643     0.0746  
Adj R-Squared  0.0286     0.0376     0.0429     0.0244     0.0311  
Obs  246     246     246     246     246  
#Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level 
  ** Significant at the 5% level 
















Table 3: Resource abundance and economic growth (standar errors in parentheses)
 # 
Variables  (3.1)    (3.2)    (3.3)    (3.4)    (3.5) 
Log(Gdpcap)  -0.0151     -0.0214      -0.0181     -0.0154     -0.0141  
  (0.0059) **    (0.0068) *    (0.0068) ***    (0.0062) **    (0.0060) ** 
Rent_forest  0.1772     0.2286     0.7520     0.1883     -0.0785  
  (0.1380)     (0.1401)     (0.3262) **    (0.1515)     (0.2111)  
Rent_mining  -0.2318     -0.2054     -2.5404     -0.2284     -2.3488  
  (0.1075) **    (0.1079) *    (0.8854) ***    (0.1093) **    (0.6323) *** 
Rent_oil&gas  0.0071     0.0092     0.0178     0.0072     0.2358  
  (0.0210)     (0.0209)     (0.0300)     (0.0210)     (0.0655) *** 
Edu  0.0043     0.0047     0.0036     0.0043     0.0034  
  (0.0025) *    (0.0025) *    (0.0025)     (0.0025) *    (0.0024)  
Invest  0.0145     0.0030     -0.0041     0.0080     0.0497  
  (0.1001)     (0.0998)     (0.0990)     (0.1066)     (0.1026)  
Gcon       -0.1514     -0.0981            
       (0.0824) *    (0.0839)            
Rent_forest * Gcon            -4.1643            
            (2.1207) *           
Rent_mining * Gcon            9.5363            
            (3.5836) ***           
Rent_oil&gas * Gcon            -0.4311            
            (0.6305)            
Ginv                 -0.0163     -0.0334  
                 (0.0913)     (0.0997)  
Rent_forest * Ginv                      1.9390  
                      (1.4737)  
Rent_mining * Ginv                      7.8515  
                      (2.2991) *** 
Rent_oil&gas * Ginv                      -6.9951  
                      (1.8639) *** 
Sumatra  -0.0057     -0.0039     -0.0023     -0.0053     0.0003  
  (0.0089)     (0.0089)     (0.0089)     (0.0092)     (0.0089)  
Kalimantan  -0.0068     -0.0020     0.0063     -0.0061     0.0050  
  (0.0133)     (0.0135)     (0.0138)     (0.0139)     (0.0139)  
Sulawesi  -0.0134     -0.0083     -0.0080     -0.0129     -0.0098  
  (0.0104)     (0.0107)     (0.0106)     (0.0107)     (0.0103)  
Papua  0.0485     0.0687 ***    0.0654     0.0515     0.0376  
  (0.0189) **    (0.0218)     (0.0216) ***    (0.0251) **    (0.0241)  
Others  -0.0080     -0.0014     -0.0040     -0.0074     -0.0074  
  (0.0123)     (0.0128)     (0.0126)     (0.0128)     (0.0122)  
C  0.2278     0.3318     0.2870     0.2345     0.2148  
  (0.0876) ***    (0.1039) ***    (0.1045) ***    (0.0954) **    (0.0917) ** 
                        
R-squared  0.0901     0.1031     0.1438     0.0902     0.1873  
Adjusted R-squared  0.0473     0.0569     0.0880     0.0433     0.1343  
Obs  246     246     246     246     246  
#Notes:  * Significant at the 10% level 
  ** Significant at the 5% level 
  ***Significant at the 1% level 16 
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